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THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF ZONING LAW IN ILLINOIS
R. MARLIN SMITH*
As the frequency of zoning cases has increased, the Supreme
Court docket appears more and more like that of a state- wide
zoning commission. '
The only thing that has changed since Dick Babcock made that
observation almost 25 years ago has been that it is no longer the docket
of the Illinois Supreme Court that looks like that of a state-wide zoning
commission. Now it is the docket of the Appellate Courts that bears
that resemblance. Nor is it the docket alone. The decisions of the Ap-
pellate Court read like those of a state-wide zoning commission.
What has happened in Illinois is that the judiciary has nearly lost
sight of the fact that challenges to the validity of zoning regulations,
except for those rare cases in which it is alleged a municipality has
exceeded its statutory authority, invariably involve constitutional adju-
dication. The constitutional nature of such challenges to local land use
regulation is frequently overlooked or glossed over by the reviewing
courts of this state. Instead the courts talk of "challenges to" or "the
validity of" municipal zoning decisions without explicitly identifying
the case as one that presents a constitutional question.2 The casual
reader of the Illinois opinions would conclude that the judiciary of this
state has fashioned some kind of sui generis cause of action known as
an action to declare a zoning ordinance invalid. The constitutional un-
derpinnings of such challenges have long since been buried beneath a
* Partner, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, Illinois.
I. Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CH. L. REV. 509,
534 (1959). [hereinafter cited as Babcock]. The title of this article has an obvious parentage in
that of the earlier Babcock article. This note is a good point to express my appreciation to my
long-time partner, Dick Babcock, and my professional colleagues and good friends Daniel
Mandelker and Norman Williams, Jr. for their helpful comments on an early draft of this article.
I do not expect them to share in the opprobium which may follow the publication of these views,
which some will surely regard as heretical.
2. See, e.g., Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Norridge, 106 Ill. App. 3d 350, 436
N.E.2d 9 (1982); National Boulevard Bank v. Village of Schaumberg, 83 I11. 2d 228, 415 N.E.2d
333 (1980); Finfrock v. City of Urbana, 39 II. App. 3d 641, 349 N.E.2d 491 (1976). But not
always. See Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals, 96 11. App. 3d 561, 575-76, 421
N.E.2d 285, 297, (1981), in which the Court said "zoning is primarily a legislative function, subject
to court review only for the purpose of determining whether the power, as exercised, involves an
undue invasion of private constitutional rights without a reasonable justification in relation to the
public welfare." For whatever it may suggest, the Court chose (or was obliged) to cite a thirty-two
year Supreme Court decision as authority for this statement, People ex rel. Joseph Lumber Co. v.
City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 321, 83 N.E.2d 592 (1949).
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prodigious pile of decisions that do not adjudicate constitutional issues
at all but do no more than decide the merits of particular land use
disputes. To be sure, this is not a new development. In that same 1959
article Babcock observed, with respect to zoning litigation,
The court does not construe the law; it examines the facts. It may in
its decision speak of 'principles' but there is persuasive evidence that
the court has convenient braces of zoning axioms, one of each pair
useful when the court has concluded that the facts favor the munici-
pality, the other handy when the court interprets the facts sympathet-
ically to the landowner.
3
In that respect all that has changed in twenty-five years is that the deci-
sional repertoire has been materially enhanced.
The result is that in zoning litigation the courts in Illinois have cast
aside the traditional judicial reluctance to hold legislative acts uncon-
stitutional and have not hesistated to do so with a frequency that belies
any deference to local legislative decisions. In fact, the Illinois courts
have been deciding land use cases on the factual merits of the dispute
while at the same time ostensibly adhering to the doctrine that the
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the local legislative
body. The result is that the legal community, both landowner's attor-
neys and municipal attorneys, are not able to advise their clients with
any degree of assurance as to the probable outcome of land use litiga-
tion that is commenced in this state.
Until 1980 the utter lack of predictability in Illinois zoning law
was an aberration that could be viewed with a certain amount of be-
mused tolerance. In that year, however, the United States Supreme
Court converted Illinois' quaint decisional practices in land use matters
into a deadly financial peril for local government. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence held that municipali-
ties could be compelled to respond in damages for regulations that
transgress the limits of the Federal constitution and that strict liability
was to be the rule where municipalities themselves were concerned.
4
Municipal immunity based upon the good faith of the officials respon-
sible for the regulation would not be a defense. After Owen the price of
constitutionally invalid regulation could be monetary damages. In that
state of the law the need for predictability became more critical, but in
Illinois there was no predictability to be had.
In Owen, Justice Brennan said piously that a municipality does not
3. Babcock, supra note 10, at 533.
4. 445 U.S. 622 (1980) reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980). The author has previously com-
mented on the implications of the Owen decision. See Smith, R.M., Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 32 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 5 (June, 1980).
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have discretion to violate the constitution. 5 Unfortunately, Justice
Brennan undoubtedly believed that, like obscenity, it is easy for anyone
to recognize unconstitutional legislation when he sees it. In the federal
courts, and in many state courts, that is undoubtedly true. Constitu-
tional challenges to land use regulations on the ground that they are
substantively wanting in due process or are a "taking" ordinarily are
confronted with nearly insurmountable hurdles.
6
The United States Supreme Court believes that the scope of a sub-
stantive due process inquiry is very limited. In United States v.
Carolene Products Co., the Court said:
• ..where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, [the in-
quiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords any support
for [the legislation].
7
The nature of the presumption of validity, to which the Illinois courts
pay formal deference in zoning litigation, was explained by Justice
Stone in Carolene Products.
...the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a char-
acter as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
8
As the Court has recently said in Agins v. City of Tiburon, which in-
volved very restrictive residential zoning regulations, the test for deter-
mining whether regulation meets substantive due process standards is:
Does the regulation "substantially advance legitimate governmental
goals.?" 9 If it does, then there can be no infringement of constitution-
5. 445 U.S. at 649.
6. The difficulty that typically confronts a plaintiff in a constitutional challenge to land use
regulations was described by Robert Anderson, a California lawyer who successfully defended the
Petaluma (Calif.) growth management plan in Construction Industry Association of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal., 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). With respect to the defense of land use cases, Anderson
has observed:
I think that if you get away from what they tried to do in Petaluma with the right to
travel [where they tried] to shift the burden of proof and get back on the traditional
business of presumption of validity, I think from the city's standpoint you just sit there
and you wait for them to try to establish for some reason that [the zoning] is unreasona-
ble. . . . [Tihey have an uphill battle and it's tough in my opinion, at least in California.
It's very difficult to show that what the City has done in a particular case is unreasonable
and therefore invalid. So from the city's standpoint it seems to me all you have to do is
just sit there, and let them go after you. Ordinarily they can't do it. Transcript of inter-
view by the author with Robert Anderson in Santa Barbara, Calif., on August 20, 1976.
7. 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
8. Id. at 152.
9. 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
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ally protected rights.
Nor does substantive due process analysis permit the courts to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the legislative body on the question of
whether the objects to be achieved by the regulation are appropriate
governmental goals. Speaking for the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa,'0
Justice Black said:
Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up
to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of
legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used
by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable,
that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or so-
cial philosophy.
Th[at] doctrine . . . has long since been discarded. We have re-
turned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legis-
lative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion'. . . Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith,
Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes or some other is no concern of ours. "
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its longstanding
reluctance to interfere with local zoning decisions on constitutional
grounds in Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., saying:
The zoning function is traditionally a governmental task requiring
the 'balancing [of] numerous competing considerations,' and courts
should properly 'refrain from reviewing the merits of [such] deci-
sions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.
' 12
The tests for determining whether a "taking" has occurred are
equally strict. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
the Supreme Court said that governmental regulation of the use of land
would not be an appropriation of private property rights when reason-
able economic uses were still available to the owner. 13 For there to be a
"taking," regulation must render property no longer "economically via-
ble." Proof that the value of property has been diminished even when
the diminution is substantial, does not establish that regulation is tanta-
10. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
1I. Id. at 729-30, 731-32.
12. 454 U.S. 1140 (1982). Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974); and,
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, - U.S. -, 52 L.W. 4673 (1984), in which the Court said:
When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other
kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts. 52 L.W. at
4676.
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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mount to acquisition. 14
In land use regulation Illinois is a chaotic exception to those well-
accepted constitutional rules. Justice Brennan may believe that sub-
stantive due process is dead as a rule of constitutional law, but if he
does, he is mistaken. It is alive, well, and living in the state courts.
Indeed, in Illinois it is running amuck. The superficial air of certainty
that the criteria listed in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook ' 5
give to Illinois zoning law have actually done nothing of the sort. In
fact, LaSalle National Bank has given the courts a roving commission
to overturn local land use decisions that they simply think are wrong.
The results have not been lost on the development community. One
developer, addressing a village board, expressed the perception that is
common in the industry this way:
While it is true, you may elect an entire board whose policy is strictly
single family, the courts will decide the highest and best use if it is
brought to the courts. And even though you and everyone on the
board wants it to be single family, if the courts feel that it is for multi
or shopping center, they are going to grant it in the courts; and then,
of course, you can appeal it to the [higher] courts, but the zoning
action doesn't stop at this level.'
6
How did we come to reach a state of affairs in which there is a
general perception that the courts are the final arbiter not of what the
constitutional limits to land use regulations are but of what the zoning
ought to be. It is in part a consequence of the fact that Illinois land use
14. Id. at 131, 136-38. See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) in which a restrictive rezoning was upheld despite the claim
that it reduced the value of the property from $2,000,000 to $100,000. In Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1961), the court sustained a municipal regulation of sand and gravel
mining that it conceded "completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previ-
ously been devoted." Id. at 592.
15. 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957). In that decision the Supreme Court said that "among
the facts which may be taken into consideration" in zoning litigation are: (1) The existing uses
and zoning of nearby property, (2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions, (3) the extent to which the destruction of property values of plaintiff
promotes the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, (4) the relative gain to the
public as compared to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner, (5) the suitabil-
ity of the subject property for the zoned purposes, and (6) the length of time the property has been
vacant as zoned considered in the context of land development in the area in the vicinity of the
subject property. Id. at 46-47, 145 N.E.2d at 69. (emphasis added).
To these considerations the Supreme Court has added an additional factor: the care with which a
community has undertaken to plan for the use of land. Sinclair Pipeline Co., v. Village of Richton
Park, 19 11. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960). In Forestview Homeowners Assoc. Inc. v. County of
Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763, Iv. to app. den., 56 Ill. 2d 582, the court held that when
there is evidence that a municipality has no comprehensive plan or planning process, then the
presumption of validity is "weakened." Id. at 242-43, 309 N.E.2d at 772-73.
16. Transcript of hearing before Northbrook Village Board in the matter of a petition for
rezoning of 13.6 acres at the southwest comer of Sanders and Lake-Cook Roads, Docket No. 81-
15, June 9, 1981, at p. 60.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
law is a classic case of arrested development. The zoning law of this
state has solidified in a stage that virtually everyone of its comparable
sister states has long since left behind.
The process has not gone without notice. Professor Norman Wil-
liams, in his treatise on American planning law, discusses four stages
through which the zoning law of the states has passed and reports:
Illinois zoning law is unique in the United States, since this is
the only state in which the courts have remained happily stuck in the
second period of American zoning, with little variation for a period
of over 40 years.
17
In Williams' "second period" the courts accepted the principle that the
use and development of land could be controlled, but when confronted
with disputes over the controls on particular tracts they tended to re-
quire municipalities to carry the burden of justifying their regulations
by identifying the harm to be avoided. 18
Quoting what he calls the "ritual list" of factors from La Salle
National Bank v. County of Cook,19 Williams describes the inevitable
lack of predictability that flows from the Illinois judicial attitude.
The courts clearly regard all this as well settled, and the tone of smug
satisfaction is unmistakable. For example, one fairly recent case said
that 'the general rules of zoning are so familiar as to be axiomatic;'
another commented that this branch of law was 'pellucid.' In addi-
tion to the often repeated approved list, there are in fact several other
considerations which have also been taken seriously in the Illinois
case law-the trend of development, the existence of heavy traffic in
the adjacent streets, whether the land has long been vacant, whether
the developer purchased the land with notice of the regulation com-
plained of, and so on. Since the list of criteria to be taken into con-
sideration is so large, no one of these is controlling, except perhaps in
the case of the homogeneous single-family neighborhood. ... In
17. ! WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.17, 143 (1974).
18. Williams' fuller description of the second period is as follows:
In the second period, following Euclid and a number of other leading cases at about the
same time, two principles were clearly established: privately owned land could be made
subject to broad restrictions on its use, without compensation, and the uses of land could
be arranged into districts. However, during this period, when specific cases arose on the
validity of zoning districts as mapped, or on the denial of variances (and occasionally of
special permits), the courts tended in many or most instances to hold the restrictive regu-
lations invalid as applied-with the single exception of cases involving homogeneous
single family residential areas, where no (or very few) nonconforming uses existed. In
this stage the courts suggested, somewhat hesitantly, that the power to regulate the physi-
cal environment extended beyond the power to control nuisances; and the principle was
clearly established that most uses of land were not exempt from control on the ground
that they were inherently 'lawful.' However, when it came to a specific case, the burden
of proof was generally on the municipalities to show why a given restriction should be
enforced, by a specific indication of the harm to be avoided thereby. Almost all states
have gone through this stage; Illinois is still clearly (and happily) resting there.
Id. § 5.03, at 104-05.
19. 12 II1. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65.
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other situations, the existence of so many criteria creates a situation
analogous to a grab bag; the courts are left with broad discretion to
decide each case according to their own view of the merits. Perhaps
this is one purpose of having so long a list.
20
The decisional disarray that has resulted from leaving the courts
"with broad discretion to decide each case according to their own view
of the merits" has produced a body of law which is anything but "pel-
lucid" and in which there are no reasonably certain touchstones for
determining the constitutional limits on local land use regulation. A
few examples from an abundance of riches will demonstrate that land
use law in Illinois gives no cause for happiness.
In some decisions the courts have applied constitutional doctrine
rigorously and have sustained zoning regulations even though the re-
strictions seem to have been seriously out of phase with the environs of
the property. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Village of Mount Prospect,21 the
court sustained a single family classification when the property faced
into a busy intersection and was across the street from the rear of an
automobile agency and a restaurant. In La Salle National Bank v.
County of Cook,22 the court upheld a single family zoning restriction
on property that was on a heavily traveled arterial street and across the
road from a regional shopping center. In Georgen v. Village of Mount
Prospect,23 the plaintiff wanted to use a site on a heavily traveled arte-
rial highway for a Poppin' Fresh Pies restaurant. The court upheld the
single family zoning of the subject property despite the fact that it was
across the street from an automobile sales agency and that a shopping
center, miniature golf course and a baseball hitting range were in the
immediate area.
On the other hand, the courts have routinely invalidated zoning
20. Williams, supra note 17 § 6.17, at 145-46. Not all commentators are as perceptive as
Williams. One author has innocently attributed the frequency with which banks appear as plain-
tiffs in Illinois zoning lawsuits to what he presumes to be their economic interest.
Zoning litigation there [Illinois] is shared by the developers and the banks on that side of
the equation, and the involvement of the banks directly in zoning cases is somewhat
unusual for the major zoning states and possibly others. I have not noticed it to any-
where near the same extent elsewhere. The banks naturally supply the money for much
of the development and presumably have an interest in the particular type of cases per-
mitted by public regulation. Some regulations provide more intensive and higher den-
sity uses. These uses, it can be fairly assumed, bring greater financial returns to investing
bankers. The bank's involvement is by way of loans, usually secured by mortgages on
property.
D. ALLENSWORTH, LAND PLANNING LAW 126 (1981). It can be "fairly assumed" that "presuma-
bly" the author was unfamiliar with the Illinois land trust. As the "The Music Man" said,
"You've gotta know the territory."
21. 15 Il. App. 3d 587, 304 N.E.2d 754 (1973).
22. 94 Ill. App. 3d 341, 418 N.E.2d 932 (1981).
23. 65 Ill. App. 3d 512, 382 N.E.2d 523 (1978).
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regulations in instances in which almost any fair-minded person would
say that reasonable minds might differ with respect to the reasonable-
ness of the restriction. In Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of
Palos Park,24 the court held single family zoning of a 19.6 acre tract of
land to be invalid even though the predominant use of land in the area
was for single family houses and a forest preserve and despite the
court's concession that a nearby stable and restaurant were not of
themselves uses which would require a zoning change. The court de-
cided that the forest preserve would provide a buffer for the single fam-
ily homes, a determination that is a planning consideration, not a rule
of law.25 Here the court said that the proximity of a major highway
"militates against single family zoning" even as it acknowledged that
residential developments adjoining heavily travelled roadways had not
prevented the courts from finding single family restrictions to be valid
in other instances, such as Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mount Prospect26
which was cited by the court. In Oak Lawn Trust and Savings Bank v.
City of Palos Heights,27 the court held invalid the single family classifi-
cation of property that prevented a former school building from being
developed with professional offices. In that case the property contained
only 1.5 acres of land, had single family residences abutting on the
north and east and across the street to the west and south, and was a
block away from the nearest commercial use. In Beaver v. Village of
Bolingbrook,28 the court invalidated single family zoning at an inter-
section and permitted commercial use of the property despite the fact
that the other three comers of the intersection were also zoned for sin-
gle family use, two of them were so developed, the third was a bean
field, and the nearest commercial uses were one mile to the north and
one mile to the south.
Not infrequently similarly situated properties get treated differ-
ently. For example, the Appellate Court reached diametrically oppo-
site results in the case of two parcels of land both of which were located
on Willow Road in unincorporated Northfield Township in Cook
County and which were only one-half mile apart. Both parcels were at
intersections, both were classified in the R-3 Single Family District,
and both fronted on Willow Road, a major arterial with a 50 mile per
hour speed limit and an average daily traffic volume of approximately
24. 106 11J. App. 3d 394, 435 N.E.2d 1265 (1982).
25. Id. at 402, 435 N.E.2d at 1272.
26. 15 I11. App. 3d 587, 304 N.E.2d 754 (1973).
27. 115 I11. App. 3d 887, 450 N.E.2d 788 (1983).
28. 12 I11. App. 3d 923, 298 N.E.2d 776 (1973).
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24,000 cars. In both instances the trial court had held the zoning inva-
lid as applied. In the first of the cases, Hutson v. County of Cook,29 the
landowner sought an injunction preventing interference with the use of
the property for a planned development that would put a convenience
shopping center at the southeast comer of Willow and Pfingsten Roads.
Although the property did not abut any other commercial zoning and
there were single family residences in the immediate area, the Appel-
late Court upheld the trial court's finding that the Cook County zoning
restrictions in four multiple family and three business districts would
all be unconstitutional in their application to the subject property and
enjoined interference with the plaintiff's proposed planned develop-
ment that was to contain a 44,000 square foot food and drug store, a
three-story, 21,000 square foot office building, and a 22,000 square foot
restaurant.
30
Four months later a different division of the same Appellate
Court, in Littlestone Co. v. County of Cook, considered the second Wil-
low Road case in which the claim was that the County's R-3 single
family restrictions were invalid insofar as they prevented the plaintiffs
from constructing a development at the northwest comer of the inter-
section of Landwehr and Willow Roads that would contain three five-
story office buildings each with 80,000 square feet of floor area and a
six story hotel.31 As with the property in the Hutson case the area
around the tract that was the subject of the dispute was zoned and used
for single family development. The property in the Littlestone case was
west of the Hutson site and only 500 feet east of the Tri-State Tollway.
The same road, the same zoning, and the same traffic produced very
different judicial reactions. In Littlestone the court said,
Admittedly there is heavy traffic on Willow Road. This in itself does
not impart a commercial character to the subject property, and al-
though it is a factor militating against residential use, it cannot be
considered conclusive.
32
However, in the Hutson case in support of the assertion that "the over-
whelming amount of evidence offered by the plaintif clearly demon-
strates that the R-3 single family zoning of the ordinance is not the
highest and best use of the subject property," the court had said,
The change of the intersection from a two-lane to a four-lane high-
way, with greatly increased traffic and the tollway, and surrounding
commercial and residential areas, demonstrate the need for a conve-
29. 17 I11. App. 3d 195, 308 N.E.2d 65 (1974).
30. Id. at 205-06, 308 N.E.2d at 72.
31. 19 Ill. App. 3d 222, 311 N.E.2d 68 (1974).
32. Id. at 238, 311 N.E.2d at 280.
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nient shopping area to take care of the expanding population. 33
In the Hutson case the court relied on commercial uses a mile to the
east for its characterization of nearby uses as the "surrounding com-
mercial. '3 4 In the Littlestone case the court found that very similar of-
fice uses on the west side of the tollway that were considerably closer
than one mile from the subject tract to be of no consequence in charac-
terizing the property in question.
The decisions with respect to the magnitude of the burden that
may be imposed upon the value of property by zoning restrictions are
not amenable to any kind of rational classification. In National
Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Village of Schaumburg,35 the court was
not impressed by plaintiffs claim that the single family restrictions
were unduly burdensome because the 26.5 acre tract would be worth
from $280,000 to $570,000 more for a multiple family use than it would
be for single family use. With a shrug of the judicial shoulders, the
court said,
The existence of a diminution in value does not necessarily require
invalidation of the zoning ordinance. The increase in density which
is characteristic of multifamily developments typically increases the
value of the property. This situation is common to virtually every
zoning case where a more intensive use is sought.
36
In Parkway Bank and Trust Company v. County of Lake,37 the valuation
difference for the 149 acre tract was even more dramatic. There the
plaintiffs claimed that the existing two acre and five acre single family
zoning gave the land a value of only $5,000 per acre, whereas if it could
be used for the light industrial purposes sought by the plaintiff it would
33. 17 11. App. 3d at 205, 308 N.E.2d at 72. (emphasis supplied) Note the careful limitation
of the court's characterization of the evidence as that "offered by the plaintiffs." One is led to
wonder what became of the principle that appellate manifest weight of the evidence review must
consider all of the evidence. A casual attitude toward factual accuracy is also common in Illinois
zoning decisions. In the Hutson case there was no "surrounding commercial." Apart from a tree
nursery across the street, the nearest commercial uses were a mile away at the Shermer-Willow
intersection. The Hutson court also notes that there is a sanitary landfill on the north side of
Willow that is "west of the railroad." That is literally true, but what the court does not tell the
reader is that there is a second railroad line, on a raised embankment, that is west of the sanitary
landfill and between it and Shermer Road to the west. The sanitary landfill was placed in that
location by the earlier decision in Society of the Divine Word v. County of Cook, 107 Ill. App. 2d
363, 247 N.E.2d 21 (1969).
34. Six years later in Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank v. County of Cook, 82 Ill. App. 3d
370, 402 N.E.2d 719 (1980), the Appellate Court sustained single family zoning on Willow Road
property that was closer to the Shermer-Willow intersection than the Hutson property. In doing
so, the Court noted that the only commercial use west of Shermer on the south side of Willow was
the shopping center that had been built as a result of the decree in Hutson. Id. at 373, 402 N.E.2d
at 723.
35. 76 Ill. App. 3d 388, 394 N.E.2d 1320 (1979), a'd, 83 Ill. 2d 228, 415 N.E.2d 333 (1981).
36. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 398, 394 N.E.2d at 1327.
37. 71 Ill. App. 3d 421, 389 N.E.2d 882 (1979).
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be worth $12,000 per acre, making a gross valuation difference of
$1,043,000. Nevertheless, the court was not impressed.
While the plaintiffs speak of 'substantial loss in value' of the land
there is not, of course, any 'loss' in the value of the land-the loss is
in the hoped for profit.
38
Parkway Bank is not alone in recognizing that what it pleases plaintiff
to characterize as an injury to the value of property is really only a
restriction on "hoped for profit." In Amalgamated Trust & Savings
Bank v. County of Cook the differential in market value was $1.3 to
$1.8 million, but even so the Court said that plaintiffs "only hardship is
that they are unable to realize as great a profit as they would like."'39
On other occasions the loss of "hoped for profit" becomes trans-
muted into grievous hardship. In Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank v.
Village of Palos Park,40 the dispute was over whether 19.6 acres should
be developed as single family or multiple family property. According
to the plaintiffs the zoning restrictions made a difference of $215,000 in
the value of the property and according to the Village it made a differ-
ence of between $80,000 and $160,000. The difference between the Vil-
lage's estimate of single family value and the plaintiffs estimate of
multiple family value was only $115,000. The court treated what it
conceded to be only a diminution of prospective profit as a hardship.
Thus, if the property were not rezoned, plaintiffs expected profit
would be significantly reduced. 4
1
The result in Oak Lawn Trust and Savings Bank v. City of Palos
Heights,42 is even more difficult to reconcile. In that instance the plain-
tiff bought a one-story school building at public auction for $100,000.
It was zoned for single family use. Then, ostensibly to his surprise,
plaintiff found he was unable to sell the school building for single fam-
ily use. So he made plans to develop it as a medical and dental office
building and sued the City of Palos Heights when it refused to reclas-
sify the property in the B-1 Restricted Business zone. The casual ob-
server might have been tempted to believe that the refusal to rezone
was a not unreasonable decision because there were single family
38. Id. at 425, 389 N.E.2d at 885.
39. 82 111. App. 3d 370, 384, 402 N.E.2d 719, 730 (1980). See also Heller v. City of Chicago,
69 Ill. App. 3d 815, 387 N.E.2d 745 (1979), in which plaintiffs effort to double the value of his
property through rezoning was rebuffed with the observation that "there has been no demon-
strated hardship on the plaintiff except that he cannot realize the huge profit that might attend a
rezoning, a consideration which courts almost uniformly have rejected as unimportant." Id. at
823, 387 N.E.2d at 749.
40. 106 Ill. App. 3d 394, 435 N.E.2d 1265 (1982).
41. Id. at 403, 435 N.E.2d at 1272.
42. 115 Ill. App. 3d 887, 450 N.E.2d 788 (1983).
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homes on all four sides of the property. But that small fact did not
trouble either the trial court or the Appellate Court. With a fine disre-
gard for the fact that the plaintiff was the author of his own predica-
ment, the Appellate Court found that there was a "loss in value of
between $115,000 and $170,000" and bailed the plaintiff out of his mis-
taken real estate investment by holding that the single family zoning of
the property was invalid. There was no talk of "hoped for profit" in the
Palos Heights case. Instead the court found that "the value of the sub-
ject property is diminished by its present zoning. '43 The court in the
Palos Heights case must have forgotten decisions like Moeller v. City of
Moline," in which the court said,
plaintiff purchased his property with full knowledge of the zoning
restrictions. While we are not unmindful of the rule that this does
not create any estoppel against him, we also think it is reasonably
clear that the purchase was made with the very purpose in mind that
he now seeks to accomplish by this suit. The claim by plaintiff that a
continuation of residential classification will inflict financial hardship
on plaintiff is therefore self-created and comes with bad grace.
45
So notwithstanding decisions like Parkway Bank and Trust Company v.
County of Lake,46 loss of "hoped for profit" may become a "taking."
There was a time when the disarray and confusion in the Illinois
decisional law about what is and what is not constitutional land use
regulation could be tolerated as a reasonably harmless eccentricity.
But the days when the courts could afford the luxury of permitting de-
cisions on the merits of zoning disputes to masquerade as constitutional
adjudication ended with Owen v. City of Independence.47  Now the
price of making unconstitutional land use decisions is not just invalida-
tion of the offending regulation but the imposition of strict liability
under the federal civil rights laws for any monetary damages that may
be occasioned by the constitutional transgression. 48 In case anyone had
missed the point in Owen, or thought that perhaps Owen did not apply
43. Id. at 892, 450 N.E.2d at 793.
44. 50 111. App. 2d 379, 200 N.E.2d 93 (1964).
45. Id. at 387-88, 200 N.E.2d at 97. See also, Urban v. Madison County Building and Zon-
ing Department, 8 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778, 290 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1972); Evanston State Bank v.
Village of Oak Park, 99 Il. App. 2d 329, 339-40, 241 N.E.2d 630, 635 (1968).
46. 71 Ill. App. 3d 421, 389 N.E.2d 882 (1979).
47. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Originally a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the statute provides:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Attorneys fees for the
"prevailing party" may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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to land use regulations or would be limited to deprivations of proce-
dural due process, Justice Brennan made sure that local governments
understood the point by remarking in a footnote to his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego,
Such liability might also encourage municipalities to err on the con-
stitutional side of police power regulations, and to develop internal
rules and operating procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory
attempts. . .After all, if a policeman must know the constitution,
then why not a planner?
49
Unfortunately, there is a small difficulty with Justice Brennan's police-
man analogy. There is no equivalent of the "Miranda card" 50 upon
which reasonably reliable guidelines for discerning unconstitutional
land use regulations can be concisely inscribed to be read to city coun-
cils and village boards before they act on zoning matters.
How did the zoning law of this state become such a decisional
gallimaufery? It is not altogether clear. In the early years, the law of
this state was not markedly different from that of any other state. The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning in City of
Aurora v. Burns,5t even before the issue reached the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.52 The lan-
guage chosen by the court to sustain the constitutionality of zoning was
deferential to the exercise of local legislative discretion.
The question is not whether we approve the ordinance under review,
but whether we can pronounce it an unreasonable exercise of power,
having no rational relation to the public health, morals, safety or
general welfare.
53
The language in City ofAurora foreshadowed that which was used a
year later by the Supreme Court in the Euclid decision.
If [the reasons for the restrictions] do not demonstrate the wisdom or
sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indi-
49. 450 U.S. 621, 661 (1981) (Brennan, dissenting).
50. The "Miranda card" is just that. It is the size of a playing card and fits readily in the
wallet or shirt pocket. On one side is printed the "Miranda Warning" which is:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You have a right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being
questioned.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any
questioning, if you wish.
5. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any
statements.
On the other side are two standardized waiver questions. (Source: Wilmette, Illinois, Police De-
partment) See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
52. 272 U.S. 365, (1926).
53. 319 Ill. at 98, 149 N.E. at 789.
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cated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least the reasons are sufficiently
cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordi-
nance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
54
Thirteen years after the City of Aurora decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court was still according the traditional deference to local
legislative discretion. In Morgan v. City of Chicago," the court still
meant what it said when it required that considerable latitutde be given
to the discretion of legislative bodies in zoning matters.
It is primarily the province of the municipal body to which the
zoning function is committed, to draw the line of demarcation as to
the use and purpose to which property shall be assigned or placed,
and it is neither the province nor duty of courts to interfere with the
discretion with which such bodies are vested, in the absence of a
clear showing of an abuse of that discretion . . .Whether the action
of the city council in passing the variation ordinance was an unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power may be fairly debata-
ble. Yet in such instances we have established the rule that this court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body
charged with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the
question. ..56
In the years since City ofAurora and Morgan the Illinois Supreme
Court, in deciding challenges to zoning ordinances, has said time and
time again that a cardinal rule is that courts must not sit as a "super
zoning commission. ' 57 Yet nothing could be clearer than that in fact
the Illinois courts are functioning as a "super zoning commission." Ex-
amples are abundant, but two should suffice as illustrations.
In Gust v. Village of Westchester 58 the Village had rezoned four
lots containing three single family residences that abutted an existing
shopping center from a single family residential zone to a business
zone. The purpose of the rezoning was to permit the expansion of a
retail supermarket in the abutting shopping center, which would entail
the removal of the houses. Residential neighbors across the street from
the houses brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the rezon-
ing on substantive due process grounds. Both the trial court and the
54. 272 U.S. at 395.
55. 370 I11. 347, 18 N.E.2d 872 (1938).
56. Id. at 350, 18 N.E.2d at 873.
57. See La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 428, 312 N.E.2d 625, 632-
33 (1974); Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 25 I11. 2d 434, 440, 185 N.E.2d
250, 253 (1962); Bennett v. City of Chicago, 24 111. 2d 270, 273-74, 181 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1962); Atkins
v. County of Cook, 18 I11. 2d 287, 292-93, 163 N.E.2d 826, 829-30 (1960); La Salle National Bank
v. County of Cook, 12 111. 2d 40, 46, 145 N.E.2d 65, 68-69 (1957); Jacobson v. City of Evanston, 10
I11. 2d 61, 69, 139 N.E.2d 205, 209 (1956).
58. 110 I11. App. 3d 425, 442 N.E.2d 525 (1982).
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Appellate Court held that the rezoning was invalid. The Appellate
Court managed to do so without ever noting that the ground of the
complaint rested on a charge that the rezoning invaded constitutionally
protected rights of the plaintiffs. The Appellate Court decided that
"[tihe homes on the subject property face the residential district and,
presently act as buffers and constitute a reasonable demarcation be-
tween the residential and business areas. '' 59 So initially the Appellate
Court put itself in the position of deciding where the zoning boundary
ought to be, an exercise in which the courts have said many times they
will not indulge.60 Then, speaking of the site plan, which showed a 25
foot driveway for trucks between the expanded building and the side-
walk to the north, the court said,
Testimony, presented by plaintiffs' experts, however, indicates that
pedestrians, cars, and semi-trailer trucks would conceivably be in a
25-foot driveway simultaneously, supporting the trial court's conclu-
sion that the proposed rear parking facility poses a safety hazard to
the public.
6 '
At this point both the trial court and the Appellate Court were not
adjudicating constitutional issues. They were substituting their judg-
ment with respect to what would be a safety hazard for that of the
corporate authorities of the Village.
The court then proceeded to stand the Illinois balancing test on its
head. It is common in Illinois zoning decisions for the court to com-
pare the benefit to the public from the restrictions in question to the
hardship that is imposed upon the property owner. 62 So in this case,
application of the balancing test should have resulted in a comparison
of the burdens imposed upon the objecting neighbors by the rezoning
to the public harm that could be avoided by, or the public benefit that
could be expected to accrue from, the expansion of the shopping center.
The Appellate Court shunned that accepted analysis and formulated its
own novel rule.
...the relative gain to the public should be compared to the hard-
ship imposed upon [the supermarket]. Absent the zoning change and
consequent expansion, the hardship imposed upon defendants is an
asserted loss of profits. In the instant case, the trial court properly
found that defendants' hardship is outweighed by the public interest
59. Id. at 429, 442 N.E.2d at 528.
60. Elmhurst National Bank v. City of Chicago, 22 Il1. 2d 396, 176 N.E.2d 771 (1961); Bohan
v. Village of North Riverside, 9 Ill. 2d 561, 138 N.E.2d 487 (1957); Bolger v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 10 Ill. 2d 596, 141 N.E.2d 22 (1957); Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank v. County of
Cook, 82 Il. App. 3d 370, 402 N.E.2d 719 (1980).
61. 110 Il. App. 3d 425, 430, 442 N.E.2d 525, 529.
62. See, e.g., Weitling v. County of Du Page, 26 Ill. 2d 196, 199, 186 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1962);
County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 IUI. 2d 253, 265, 181 N.E.2d 85, 90 (1962).
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in safety and maintaining the integrity of the established residential
neighborhood.
63
This passage is simply incredible. The supermarket was not the plain-
tiff. It was not complaining of the zoning. The neighboring property
owners were. The supermarket and the village (who were both defend-
ants) were not asserting a hardship-the neighbor plaintiffs were. The
defense against the plaintiffs' complaint was that the rezoning would
promote the welfare of the public. The question of whether the "de-
fendants" had a hardship or might lose profits was totally irrelevant to
the due process question which was whether the Village Board of
Trustees could have reasonably believed that the rezoning would bene-
fit the welfare of the public by preserving convenience shopping in the
Village and preventing deterioration of the shopping center from ad-
versely impacting nearby businesses and residences. Instead of defer-
ring to the legislative judgment, the Appellate Court set itself up as the
arbiter of the public interest by comparing the supermarket's "hard-
ship" to the "public interest in safety and maintaining the integrity of
established neighborhoods" and came down on the side of a "public
interest" that presumptively the Village Board had already weighed
against the benefits that would accrue from an expanded shopping
center. This rationale was a direct judicial intrusion into the local leg-
islative process. What the Appellate Court did was to decide what pub-
lic objectives it believed should have been important to the Village
Board and then compared its conception of what the supermarket's
hardship might be to the achievement of those judicially pronounced
objectives.
But the Appellate Court was not through. Before closing it noted
that the "Illinois courts have adopted the modem view that aesthetic
factors such as the aesthetic enjoyment of one's home, do have a signifi-
cant bearing on zoning." 64 However, the decisions upon which the
court relied stand for the view that local government may seek to
achieve aesthetic objectives through the use of the police power. 65 But,
Gust was not a case in which the Village had sought to achieve aes-
thetic objectives through the exercise of the police power. In effect the
Appellate Court found that the expansion of the supermarket would be
aesthetically objectionable to the neighbors and was therefore objec-
63. 110 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 442 N.E.2d at 529. See, Kleidon v. City of Hickory Hills, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 1043, 458 N.E.2d 931 (1984), for a decision in which the same court applied the orthodox
tests to a zoning challenge by neighboring property owners.
64. Id.
65. See Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank v. County of Cook, 82 I11. App. 3d 370, 402
N.E.2d 719 (1980); Ward v. County of Cook, 68 Il. App. 3d 563, 386 N.E.2d 309 (1979).
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tionable to it. So the Court substituted its aesthetic opinions for those
of the Village Board. So much for the principle that in zoning cases
courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the municipal
authorities.
Another example of judicial second-guessing is Haws v. Village of
Hinsdale66 in which the Appellate Court held that the Village had un-
constitutionally applied the Planned Development District provisions
of its zoning ordinance to plaintiffs' property by denying their request
to allow the site to be used for a fast food restaurant. The case turned
on the factual question of whether the proposed use would create traffic
congestion and hazards. There were conflicting traffic opinions offered
by the parties and it was clear that the Village officials could have rea-
sonably held the view that the proposed use posed traffic hazards be-
cause even the Appellate Court described the case as involving "a
potentially serious traffic problem. ' 67 The trial court decided the traffic
dispute in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Court let that determi-
nation stand, saying,
We recognize that a presumption of validity attaches to the zoning
ordinance and that if such an ordinance is reasonably debateable it
should be upheld. (citations omitted) However, the trial court was in
the best position to sft and weigh the massive amount of technical testi-
mony, much of it contradictory, on this traffic issue in order to decide
whether this presumption of validity had been overcome. 68
The quoted passage, while avowing deference to the presumption of
validity, in fact ignores it. It does, however, have the merit of candor
because the Court implicitly asserts that the trial judge was in a better
position than the Village to decide whether the proposed use would be
a traffic hazard. The Haws decision illustrates the problem neatly. In
losing sight of what a substantive due process challenge means, the
courts are led to ask the wrong question. The question in Haws should
not have been: Who is in the best position to judge traffic hazards? It
should have been: Could the Village Board have reasonably believed
the proposed use would create a traffic hazard? If the answer was yes,
as it would almost have to have been on the facts in Haws, then sub-
stantive due process principles would require that the municipal deci-
sion be upheld.
Even when it is upholding a local zoning decision, the judiciary is
capable of casually tossing off dicta that both reveal the judicial mind
set in zoning matters and store up trouble for future decisions. In Chi-
66. 68 111. App. 3d 226, 386 N.E.2d 122 (1979).
67. Id. at 232, 386 N.E.2d at 126.
68. Id. at 235, 386 N.E.2d at 128 (emphasis added).
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cago Title & Trust Co. v. County of Cook, 69 the Appellate Court upheld
the decision of the county to rezone property for commercial use, but in
doing so said,
Clearly, the property does not appear to be part of a solidly residen-
tial area. So, unless some compelling reasons of public welfare or
safety exists, the imposition of a residential restriction on the subject
property could be properly found to be unreasonable.
70
Compelling reasons? Since when is the language of strict scrutiny anal-
ysis appropos in an ordinary zoning case? No better demonstration
could be offered for the proposition that the Illinois courts pay formal
deference to the presumptive validity of zoning regulations while men-
tally requiring the municipal defendant to justify the reasonableness of
its land use restrictions.
There does not appear to be any single reason for the decisional
quagmire into which the zoning law of this state has been run. Among
the likely legal explanations, three candidates stand out. They are:
1. The focus in the Illinois decisions on the "highest and best use"
of land.
2. The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in La Salle National
Bank v. County of Cook .
7
1
3. The characterization of discretionary local decisions with respect
to how particular parcels of land shall be used and developed as
legislative decisions.
72
The zoning law of Illinois is nearly unique in its emphasis upon
highest and best use, which is an economic concept that is used by ap-
praisers in valuing real estate. The rule in most states is very clear.
Property owners are not entitled to the "highest and best use" of their
land. The late Arden Rathkopf, in his authoritative text, articulated
the nearly universally accepted view.
It is the generally accepted rule that a zoning ordinance is not
69. 120 Ill. App. 3d 443, 457 N.E.2d 1326.
70. 120 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 457 N.E.2d at 1332-33 (emphasis supplied). The "compelling
reasons" slip of the judicial tongue is not the only gaffe in this opinion. The court, in dealing with
a res judicata question, overlooked long-settled rules with respect to privity of title by suggesting
that a mere change in the ownership of the subject property could defeat the identity of parties
that is required for the application of res judicata. 120 I11. App. 3d at 454, 457 N.E.2d at 1334.
71. 12 11. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
72. Whether a decision is characterized as legislative or administrative depends not upon the
nature of the proceeding (i.e. whether it is adversarial and fact finding as opposed to policy mak-
ing) but upon the body that makes the decision. Thus if the final decision is left to the city council
or village board of trustees, it is legislative irrespective of whether it involves a rezoning, a special
use permit, or a variation. See LaGrange State Bank v. County of Cook, 53 I11. App. 3d 79, 368
N.E.2d 601 (1977); Meyer v. County of Madison, 7 I11. App. 3d 289, 287 N.E.2d 159 (1972),
Camardo v. Village of LaGrange Park, 61 111. App. 2d 302, 210 N.E.2d 16 (1965); Traders Devel-
opment Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 20 I11. App. 2d 383, 156 N.E.2d 274 (1959); Village of
Justice v. Jamison, Ill. App. 2d 113, 129 N.E.2d 269 (1955).
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rendered confiscatory and unreasonable solely for the reason that the
value of the land is greater for uses which are not permitted thereon
than for those which are. There is a distinction between finding that
the property which is the subject of the suit is not zoned for its "best
and most profitable use" or its "highest and best use" and finding
that the present zoning amounts to a deprivation of the plaintiff's
right to make reasonable use of his property. Stated otherwise, the
ordinance is not to be held unconstitutional as depriving its owner of
property without due process merely because the property may not
be put to its most profitable use.
7 3
So governmental regulation may prevent that use which, absent regula-
tion, might be the highest and best use, but that does not make the
regulation constitutionally infirm. The requirements of the constitution
are satisfied if the property owner is allowed a reasonable use of his
property. The emphasis in the Illinois decisions on comparative prop-
erty values instead of reasonable economic use simply gives developers
an incentive to attempt to maximize development so as to make the
"loss in value" more dramatic and, hence, more persuasive.74 Regret-
ably, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently exacerbated an already
serious misconception by seeming to embrace the idea that landowners
73. 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING (4th ed.) § 6.04, 6-9 to 6-13 (1984).
See, e.g., Board of County Commissioners v. Mountain Air Ranch, 192 Colo. 364, 563 P.2d 341
(1977) ("it is clearly not necessary that the land be available for the 'highest and best use' ");
Dauernheim v. Town Board of Town of Hempstead, 33 N.Y.2d 468, 354 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974);
("Plaintiff is entitled to have his property yield a reasonable return. It need not be the most
profitable or greatest return."); North Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford,
60 N.Y.2d 492, 458 N.E.2d 809, 811, (1983) ("the issue is not whether other zoning would be
appropriate or whether the property is zoned for its highest and best use but whether the existing
zoning classification deprives the owner of any use to which it is reasonably adapted.") Township
of Neville v. Exxon Corp., 14 Pa. Comm. 225, 322 A.2d 144 (1974). The Rathkopf text, at pp. 6-10
to 6-11 and pp. 33-36 of the cumulative supplement, notes decisions from 26 states which reject the
notion that the "highest and best use" or the "most profitable use" has any bearing on a zoning
dispute. Curiously, the list includes four Illinois Supreme Court decisions, none of them recent or
in current vogue as citations. The four are Galt v. Cook County 405 I11. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395
(1950); First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest v. Lake Forest, 7 I11. 2d 213, 130 N.E.2d 267 (1955);
(highest and best use and lessened value are only factors to be considered); Bolger v. Village of
Mt. Prospect, 10 111. 2d 596, 141 N.E.2d 22 (1957); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 24 111.
2d 59, 179 N.E.2d 673 (1962). Of the four decisions only First National speaks explicitly of highest
and best use and then only to recognize it as a factor to be weighed. For a discussion of the
different approaches to analyzing "taking" claims, see D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 15-36
(1982).
74. One of the more perceptive and thoughtful Illinois trial court judges recently took note of
this phenomenon. In a case in which plaintiffs were seeking to invalidate the single family zoning
of their property so as to consummate a sale of the property for $1.2 million to a developer who
proposed to build a six story office building on the site, the court, commenting on evidence of a
need to expend $470,000 for water and sewer service extensions, said,
"... [Sluch expenditures when coupled with the purchase price encourage developers to
make excessive use of the property."
(Transcript of opinion of Hofert, J., in Parkway Bank & Trust Company v. County of Cook,
Circuit Court of Cook County Case No. 82 L 11408, January 4, 1984).
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do have a constitutional right to the "best" use of their property.75
As used by appraisal experts in zoning litigation, the term "highest
and best use" is commonly defined as "the use to which the property
can be put over a period of time, with the greatest amount of monetary
return to the owners."' 76 One highly qualified appraiser defined "high-
est and best use" as:
[tihe use to which a property may be put that would produce the
greatest land value for the greatest return to the owner over a given
period of time. When that use is dependent upon a zoning change or
amendment, consideration [is given] to the need and demand for the
type of use proposed; its overall compatibility with existing land use
and zoning patterns in the vicinity; and, most important, its impact
on value, use, and marketability of other property in the vicinity.
77
Actually, the meaning of the term is not quite so simple because highest
and best use studies are not designed to provide testimonial support for
zoning challenges, as the definitive text on appraisal principles and
methodology of the American Institute of Appraisers makes clear.
Highest and best use is defined as:
The reasonable and probable use that supports the highest present
value, as defined, as of the date of the appraisal.
Alternatively, highest and best use is:
The use, from among reasonably probable and legal alternative uses,
found to be physically possible, appropriately supported, financially
feasible, and that results in the highest present land value.
The second definition applies specifically to the highest and best use
of land or sites as though vacant. When a site contains improve-
ments, the highest and best use may be determined to be different
from the existing use. The existing use will continue unless and until
land value in its highest and best use exceeds the sum of the value of
the entire property in its existing use and the cost to remove the
improvements.
Implied in these definitions is that the determination of highest
and best use takes into account the contribution of a specific use to
the community and community development goals as well as the
75. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan, 95 Ill. 2d 516, 533, 449 N.E.2d 69, 77 (1983).
There is nothing in the Harris Trust opinion to suggest that the Court expected anyone to be
startled by its double reference to "best use," so perhaps it should not be taken as an indication
that the Court intends to enshrine a guarantee of "best use" as a rule of zoning law. If it does, it is
going to have to explain away some very inconvenient prior opinions such as La Salle Nat'l Bank
v. City of Evanston, 57 I11. 2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974), and the Illinois decisions listed at supra
note 60.
76. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan, 95 I11. 2d 516, 531, 449 N.E.2d 69, 76 (1983).
77. Transcript of testimony of William McCam in Frenchman's Cove v. Village of North-
brook, No. 81 CH 52 16, Report of Proceedings at 314-15 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County August 1,
1983).
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benefits of that use to individual property owners.78
Highest and best use analysis can take into account the possibility
of securing a zoning change but only when the local government has
not had the question presented to it.
In the absence of private restriction, uses allowed under zoning typi-
cally constitute the available choices in most highest and best use
determinations. However, a possible change in zoning should not be
precluded from the appraiser's consideration of what is legally
permissible.
79
Appraisers are cautioned that in making highest and best use studies,
Risks as well as returns are appropriate considerations in the analysis
of highest and best use and should be weighed quantitatively as
much as possible. A prediction that depends on a specific future
event, such as a favorable zoning determination, cannot be justified if
the probability of that event has not been carefully considered and
factored into the feasibility analysis.80
Predictions with respect to zoning changes may be appropriate
when the question is whether or not the local authorities will change
the zoning on a particular piece of property. But once local govern-
ment has refused to change the zoning and litigation has ensued, then
consideration of the probability of rezoning requires the appraiser to
assess the probability that the existing land use regulations will be ad-
judicated to be constitutionally invalid. Put another way, when highest
and best use testimony is offered in support of a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of local zoning regulations it becomes a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. So the first step toward the re-establishment of coherent
constitutional principles in zoning cases should be the quiet interment
of highest and best use testimony. Instead the courts should ask
whether there is any reasonable economic use that can be made of the
property under the existing zoning regulations. If there is, then the reg-
ulations do not impose a constitutionally impermissible burden.
The second problem is the La Salle National Bank decision. The
standards set out in that opinion81 were intended as an aid to analysis
in "taking" and substantive due process challenges. The repetitive in-
cantation of those standards in zoning case after zoning case has effec-
tively ossified the La Salle Bank factors into the touchstone of
constitutionality. And in becoming etched in stone, the La Salle Bank
standards have virtually obscured the constitutional substance of the
78. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE
244 (1983) (emphasis supplied). This is the standard text for appraisers.
79. Id. at 251.
80. Id. at 57 1.
81. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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litigation in which they are employed. Thus we get decisions like Gust
v. Westchester in which the Appellate Court can write an entire opin-
ion without even once identifying the cause of action as one that is
grounded in a constitutional claim and that do not use the words "con-
stitution," "constitutionality," "due process," or "taking" anywhere in
the opinion.
So one of the principal matters that is amiss in Illinois zoning law
is that the La Salle Bank criteria have become the beginning and the
end of judicial analysis in zoning cases. They are treated by the courts
as a kind of independent cause of action called an "action to declare a
zoning ordinance invalid." The La Salle Bank standards lead courts
astray because they focus judicial attention upon the merits of the dis-
pute rather than on whether a reasonably viable, economic use remains
of the land or whether the facts preclude the existence of any rational
basis for the local land use decision. They encourage courts to balance
competing considerations-an exercise that the Supreme Court, in
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, described as a governmental function.8 2 Ask-
ing, as the Illinois courts do, whether the gain to the public justifies the
burden on the landowner inevitably entices the courts into making
judgments with respect to the social value and utility of the public
objectives sought to be achieved by the zoning regulations.
So, the fatal flaw in the LaSalle Bank standards is that they insidi-
ously lure courts into weighing and balancing the factual and opinion
evidence. But the function of a court reviewing a legislative act for
constitutional validity is not to weigh the evidence in the traditional
sense, but to determine from the evidence whether the legislation is
without any reasonable basis.8 3 The LaSalle Bank standards are no
more than a characterization of the kinds of facts which can be
weighed in determining whether there exists any state of facts either
known, or which may reasonably be assumed, that afford support for
the legislative decision. This crucial distinction is almost invariably
overlooked altogether or blurred beyond recognition in Illinois zoning
decisions.
The emphasis in the Illinois zoning decisions upon the use pro-
posed to be made of property rather than on the constitutionality of the
existing zoning aggravates the tendency of the LaSalle Bank standards
82. See supra text accompanying note 12.
83. See Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. Ostrum, 113 Wisc. 2d 612, 335 N.W.2d 596, 604 (1983).
(Not a land use case. The decision holds that a Wisconsin statute requiring licensed metallic
mineral explorers to disclose geologic exploration data and provide core samples to the state was a
"taking" of a property right which could not be sustained in the absence of compensation.)
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to push the courts into weighing the merits of the land use dispute. The
constitutional questions are (1) is the restriction wanting in due process,
i.e., is it unreasonable because it has no relationship to the purposes for
which the zoning power is granted; (2) is it confiscatory; and (3) does it
deny equal protection? Illinois courts do not examine the existing zon-
ing from this perspective. The analytical approach sanctioned by the
Illinois Supreme Court encourages the courts to focus on the proposed
use by making the validity of a zoning restriction depend upon the na-
ture of the use which is prohibited by the current restrictions. 84 This
focus on the reasonableness of the landowner's proposed use, when em-
ployed in the context of the LaSalle Bank factors, diverts the courts
from constitutional analysis and leads inexorably to their sitting in
judgment on the merits of the local zoning decision. Put simply, the
emphasis on the proposed development quite plainly leads courts to
decide zoning cases by asking themselves: How can it hurt if the plain-
tiff is permitted to do so as he wishes with the property? That inquiry
unavoidably results in shifting the burden of justification onto the mu-
nicipality and in frustrating the application of the rules of constitu-
tional adjudication by dissipating the presumptive validity of the
regulation.
85
In litigation over other police power ordinances, the Illinois courts
have not lost sight of the stringent requirements of substantive due pro-
cess analysis. In upholding a municipal ordinance that prohibited any-
one within the municipality from owning or possessing handguns, the
Appellate Court said,
We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the ordinance in question
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. A municipality
has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the
public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure
those interests. We will not disturb an exercise of police power
merely because there is room for a difference of opinion as to its
wisdom or necessity.86
The courts of this state need to remind themselves that the same
"broad discretion" applies to zoning decisions as much as it does to gun
control. The judiciary needs to remember that the validity of a zoning
84. See Schultz v. Village of Lisle, 53 II. 2d 39, 289 N.E.2d 614 (1972).
85. Land use regulations that do not involve zoning do not suffer from such burden shifting
and are usually accorded a genuinely effective presumption of validity. See, for example, Village
of Skokie v. Walton on Dempster, 119 Ill. App. 3d 299, 456 N.E.2d 293, (1983), in which the court
upheld the constitutionality of sign regulations that were prompted by considerations of commu-
nity aesthetics.
86. Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 13 Ill. App. 3d 488, 493, 447 N.E.2d 849, 852
(1983).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
ordinance, unless it is grounded on a claim that statutory authority has
been exceeded, raises constitutional questions that have the potential
for cutting deeply into the separation of governmental powers and that
therefore require the same deference to the zoning decisions of the local
legislative body as would be given as a matter of course to any other
local legislative exercise of the police power. It may indeed be true that
the courts know better what the public interest requires than local
elected officials do, but the principles of our jurisprudence do not per-
mit them to base their decisions on that assumption.
And that brings us to the third and final problem, which is: Are
local zoning decisions with respect to particularized uses of land really
legislative decisions at all? And if they are not, what implications does
that have for the standard of judicial review?
In City ofAurora v. Burns the Illinois Supreme Court, had ob-
served, "zoning is regulation by districts and not by individual pieces of
property. ' 87 Over 20 years ago two members of the Illinois Supreme
Court expressed grave reservations about the drift away from "regula-
tion by districts" and the practice, which even then was burgeoning, of
using zoning ordinances as a mechanism for controlling the particular,
specific use to be made of individual parcels of land on the ground that
such ad hoc zoning decisions were antithetical to basic zoning princi-
ples. In Ward v. Village of Skokie, 88 Justice Klingbiel expressed his
concern over the turn that zoning had taken.
It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits, make spe-
cial exceptions, or decide particular cases. Such activities are not leg-
islative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in character.
To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose acts as such
are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbi-
trary government. 89
If the decisions of the Illinois courts in zoning cases sound like
those of a "super zoning commission," it is because they do not involve,
except in rare instances, broad questions of public policy with respect
to land use regulations or even the facial validity of particular regula-
tory techniques. Instead they involve only the very narrow question of
the way in which a particular parcel of land should be used and devel-
oped. The local decision-making process in such instances is almost
87. 319 Ill. 84, 98, 149 N.E. 784, 789 (1925).
88. 26 II. 2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962).
89. Id. at 424, 186 N.E.2d at 533 (Klingbiel, J., and House, J., specially concurring). Justices
Klingbiel and House were specifically concerned with the proliferation of special use permit pro-
cedures in which prior permission of the city council or village board is required before certain
uses may be established.
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invariably adversarial. Hearings before local authorities are often
highly controversial with exhibits, expert opinion testimony, and, not
infrequently, inflammatory oratory from all concerned and their attor-
neys. In such instances the function of the city council or the village
board of trustees is essentially adjudicatory. It needs to be recognized
as such. The courts must analyze the real nature of the process instead
of automatically characterizing decisions as legislative just because
they are made by the body that has local legislative authority. The
present practice of using the locus of the final decision-making author-
ity as the determinant exalts form over substance. 90 It also results in
the courts being deprived of an opportunity to form any sure judgment
as to the reliability of the local decision. The corollary is that we also
need to recognize that the appropriate method of judicial review of de-
cisions on the specific use to be made of particular parcels is not a trial
de novo on constitutional substantive due process or taking claims, but
a review of the record made before the local body to determine
whether, considering the evidence that was offered to it, the decision
was arbitrary and capricious. In that type of proceeding, constitutional
issues would not be raised routinely. In that context the threshold
question on judicial review would be simply whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the decision made by the local body. If
traditional constitutional issues were raised on judicial review of the
local decision, the courts could, with an easier conscience, apply the
demanding standards of constitutional adjudication to the resolution of
those issues. The need to cloak doubts about the reliability of the local
decision in the incantation of constitutional formulas would no longer
exist.
Justices Klingbiel and House may have been ignored in Illinois,
but their observations have been accorded great deference in other
states. Ten years ago the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. Board of
County Commissioners of Washington County,91 described Justice
Klingbiel's concerns as a "growing judicial recognition" of the fact of
life that "[1]ocal and small decision groups are simply not the
equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures. ' 92 So the
Oregon Supreme Court held that particularized land use decisions were
quasi-judicial, and placed the burden of proof with respect to requests
90. When decisions are made finally by an administrative body such as the Board of Zoning
Appeals, they are reviewable on the administrative record under the Administrative Review Act.
I11. Rev. Stat., c. 110, 1 3-102 and 3-108.
91. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
92. Id. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26.
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for specific changes on the applicant at the local level.9 3
One year before the Fasano decision the Washington Supreme
Court had reached the same conclusion.
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehen-
sive plan and zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in
amending a zoning code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same
body, in effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by
the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning
change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily identifi-
able. Although important questions of public policy may permeate a
zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one
group of citizens than on the public generally.94
Since Fasano, four other states have adopted the view that particu-
larized land use decisions are quasi-judicial. The most recent is Idaho
in Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners ofAda County,95 in which
the Idaho Supreme Court said,
We are persuaded the cases which characterize as quasi-judicial the
action of a zoning body in applying general rules or policies to spe-
cific individuals, interests, or situations represent the better rule. The
shield from meaningful judicial review which the legislative label
provides is inappropriate in these highly particularized land use deci-
sions. The great deference given true legislative action stems from its
high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that an appropri-
ate remedy can be had at the polls . . . This rationale is inapposite
when applied to a local zoning body's decision as to the fate of an
individual's application for rezone. Most voters are unaware or un-
concerned that fair dealing and consistent treatment may have been
sacrificed in the procedural informality which accompanies action
deemed legislative. Only by recognizing the adjudicative nature of
these proceedings and by establishing standards for their conduct can
the rights of the parties directly affected, whether proponents or op-
ponents of the application, be given protection.
96
The Fasano states have recognized that the adversarial nature of
land use decisions with respect to particular parcels makes substantive
due process analysis singularly inappropriate because inevitably either
93. In Fasano, the Oregon court required proof of conformity of the change with the compre-
hensive plan, of a public need for a change of the kind in question, and a showing that the need
would best be served by changing the classification of the particular piece of property in question
as compared with other available property. Id. at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 28. The public need and
"other available property" standards have since been abandoned by the Oregon Supreme Court
on the ground that statutory mandatory planning legislation has made them unnecessary. Neu-
berger v. City of Portland, 288 Ore. 155, 603 P.2d 772, (1979); rehearing den. with supplementary
opinion 288 Ore. 585, 607 P.2d 722 (1980).
94. Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327.
95. 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). The others are: Colorado: Snyder v. City of Lake-
wood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); Kansas: Golden v. Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584
P.2d 130 (1978); Montana: Lowe v. City of Missoula, 165 Montana 38, 525 P.2d 551 (1974).
96. 101 Idaho at 410, 614 P.2d at 950-51.
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the characterization of the decision as legislative insulates it from
meaningful review or, if the focus of the inquiry is on the soundness of
the particular decision and the planning principles that support it, then
settled principles of constitutional adjudication must be jettisoned sub
silentio.
Nearly eighty years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissent-
ing in Lochner v. New York, said "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' 97 Neither does the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment, enact the planning
philosphies of Frederick Law Olmstead, Daniel Burnham, or the Na-
tional Association of Homebuilders. Nevertheless, the galloping revi-
val of the most discredited aspects of the substantive due process test
continues apace in Illinois. The judicial proclivity for intervening in
the merits of land use disputes may well stem more from an abiding
suspicion about the reliability of the local land use decision-making
process than it does from any misconception of the extent to which the
Constitution restrains the use of land use controls.98 But the kaleido-
scopic pattern of land use decisions in this state that results simply en-
courages disappointed or disgruntled landowners or neighbors to
importune the judiciary to pass judgment on the wisdom of local zon-
ing decisions. The temptation to intervene when a judge believes that a
local decision has been mistaken can be a persuasive incentive for in-
validating the regulation. Indeed, in the course of oral argument in a
zoning case an Appellate Court judge once asked the author, "Don't
these municipalities make a lot of mistakes?" 99 The conviction that lo-
cal authorities are prone to make mistakes and that their decisions are
not really as reliable as those of the state legislature leads to a pervasive
skepticism about the fundamental reasonableness of the local land use
decision-making process. Or, as Dick Babcock reported some years
ago, "A state Supreme Court Justice told me he decided at least one
well-noted case against the municipality because he simply could not
accept the view that officials of a small governmental unit were capable
of exercising fairness where decisions on land use matters required con-
97. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
98. When the local land use decision is "legislative" (see supra note 72), the Illinois courts do
not examine the record made locally in support of a rezoning or other request for zoning relief
because the decisional rule is that the courts are forbidden to do so. See Forestview Homeowner's
Ass'n v. County of Cook, (1st Dist. 1978), 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 304 N.E.2d 763; Siegal v. City of
Chicago, (1st Dist., 1970) 127 11. App. 2d 84, 261 N.E.2d 802; Anthony v. City of Kewanee, (3rd
Dist., 1967) 79 11. App. 243, 223 N.E.2d 738.
99. In the interest of avoiding personalities, the name of the misguided jurist has been
withheld.
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siderable discretion.' °° The not infrequently demonstrated municipal
capacity for capriciousness surely has led many other judges to the
same unstated conviction.
The only way to deal with the judiciary's obvious sense of unease
about the nature of the local land use decision-making process is to lay
that process before the courts and give them an opportunity to test the
municipal land use decision for reasonableness or arbitrariness on the
basis of the record made in support of and opposition to the proposed
rezoning or special permit. The further consequence of characterizing
particularized land use decisions as quasi-judicial is that the procedure
by which such decisions are made must be attended by a full range of
procedural due process protections.10' This means that all interested
persons must have a full opportunity to be heard and that an opportu-
nity for cross-examination must be accorded. 0 2 And it means that
there must be a verbatim record of proceedings and specific written
findings of fact and conclusions upon which the decision is based.
10 3
The prescription is rather strong medicine, but judicial confidence
in the reliability and integrity of the local land use decision-making
process will not be restored until municipalities give up on the tattered
shreds of the presumption of validity in zoning cases and welcome the
review of those disputes on the basis of the record that was made before
and considered by the local decision-making body. On review, then,
the attention of the courts will be focused on a question with which
they are more accustomed to dealing, which is: Was there substantial
evidence to support the decision that the local authorities reached? Co-
incidentally, those twin sirens, "highest and best use" and the LaSalle
Bank criteria, will achieve a well-deserved obsolesence. Courts will
then be able to protect applicants and objectors from arbitrary deci-
sions without debasing constitutional principles in order to reach a re-
sult that is deemed meritorious.
100. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 105 (1966).
101. See Fasano v. Washington County, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Cooper v. Board of
Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980).
102. This is not novel doctrine. It has already been accepted in Illinois by one Appellate
Court. See E & E Hauling v. County of Du Page, 77 II1. App. 3d 1017, 396 N.E.2d 1260 (1979).
103. Fasano v. Washington County, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); contains a useful cata-
logue of the procedural due process fights that must attend a quasi-judicial proceeding. Promi-
nent among the Oregon requirements is a ban on ex parie communications with the decision-
makers. The Washington "appearance of fairness" rule has also been applied to preclude exparte
communication with the local decision-making body. See Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d
715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). In Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Ore. 585, 607 P.2d 722 (1980), the
Oregon court disavowed any intention that the ex parte contact rule was to be applied
"mechanically."
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